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John E. Joseph 
The arbre-tree sign1: Pictures and words in counterpoint in the Cours de linguistique générale 
 
1 Introduction 
To be truthful, during the first twenty minutes of viewing the 
film, I, who have been thirty years in this business of making 
films, did not know what it was all about. I may be dumb, but 
I have asked at least fifty people who in more or less 
articulate form described the same experience.  
Erich von Stroheim, review of Citizen Kane, 1941 
We contributors to this special issue of Semiotica marking the centenary of the Cours de linguistique 
générale (CLG) are poorly placed to understand how difficult the book appeared to its early readers. 
Even if we recall the trouble we ourselves may have had with it on our first reading – as a teenager, 
in my case – we were nevertheless already in an intellectual atmosphere that the book had gone a 
long way toward shaping. By now, after countless rereadings, it appears to me the very model of 
clarity of thought and expression, putting forward a vision of language so obvious that I am surprised 
when others find it hard to follow or read it differently from me. But it happens. 
My initial instinct is to correct their (mis)interpretations by having recourse to the text or its source 
materials. But linguists are not lawyers, nor divinely inspired, and the texts we write will always give 
rise to multiple readings. This is particularly so with the CLG, given its complex authorship. In some 
instances, interpolations by Bally and Sechehaye arguably run counter to what Saussure was 
struggling to articulate (on the editing process see further Sofia 2015); nevertheless it is hard to 
accept Bouquet’s (1997) judgement that the editors botched the job. One can only look with awe 
upon the success they made of a task that any sober prediction would have deemed impossible. 
Their decision to include illustrations in the text is a case in point. The illustrations are a double-
edged sword. By offering a second modality for readers to comprehend novel and challenging 
theoretical concepts, Saussure at the blackboard, then Bally and Sechehaye at the editing table, 
extended a hand to students and readers to guide them into his conceptual world via the stepping-
stones of the semi-familiar, accessible and ‘concrete’, insofar as that term is used to distinguish what 
can be readily visualised from what resists such depiction (the ambiguities of ‘concrete’ and 
‘abstract’ are examined in Chapter 9 of Joseph 2016). 
Given that first-time readers of the CLG still find it daunting (whereas even young children no longer 
have trouble with the structure of Citizen Kane, so completely did it remake the language of cinema 
and later television and video games), they grasp the extended hand with relief. Once delivered to 
the stepping-stones of the semi-familiar, they do not always make the next step of returning to the 
complexities of the text. Even if they do, and find that the text suggests contradictions with what 
they have understood from the illustrations, they may not readjust their understanding of the 
                                                          
1 My main title is a bow to Levin (1989), which, as noted on its first page, began as a paper he gave in 1985 at 
the University of California at Davis, in which he argued unforgettably that the idea of the linguistic sign being 
arbitrary came to Saussure when, having drawn a tree to illustrate a point about language (see below, Section 
4), he started to think about the French and English words for it: arbre, tree, arbre-tree, arbritree … arbitrary. 
Although Levin’s published paper contains no mention of this, or indeed of the word arbre, its ghost haunts his 
paper’s title – and now mine. 
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illustrations, but instead interpret the text to accord with that understanding, somehow 
accommodating the seeming contradictions.  
If they emerge with a Saussure that works for them, that is not to be discounted. They read the CLG, 
or assign parts of it to their students to read, for a reason, generally involving some concept, model 
or technique they are promoting or contesting or just striving to understand. Theirs will always be a 
partial Saussure, in both senses of the word. That is inevitable. The job of those of us who have 
made the CLG one of our specialisms is to help guide them toward our best understanding of 
Saussure’s teaching, when what they seek is a textually ‘authentic’ Saussure, whether the 
authenticity is to the CLG, its source materials (referred to in this paper by the numbers given to 
them in the critical edition of the CLG by Engler, conventionally abbreviated to CLG/E) or earlier 
abandoned manuscripts. Yet no reading, however well-documented, is the sole legitimate one. Any 
such monopolistic claim needs to be contested quite as much as do interpretations with no textual 
basis. 
Starting from that premise, I shall examine seven of the illustrations or sets of illustrations in the CLG 
and the various interpretations to which they have given or could give rise, treating these not as 
erroneous but as contrapuntal to the text when the two appear to be in contradiction. These are by 
no means all the illustrations in the CLG; for reasons of space I have left out those in Parts Three and 
Four (there are none in Part Five), and in the earlier parts have limited myself to those that have had 
the most impact on readings of the book.2  
 
2 The talking heads and the speech circuit 
The first illustration in the CLG (Introduction, Chapter 3, p. 27) is the famous one of two heads, 
labelled A and B, facing each other, with dotted lines connecting the centre of one cranium to that of 
the other. One line passes through A’s mouth and B’s ear, the other through B’s mouth and A’s ear. 
 
This is a case where we find a clear gap between the notebooks of Saussure’s students (CLG/E 196) 
and what is in the CLG, both in the verbal text and in the illustration. The most careful of the student 
notes, those of Émile Constantin (IIIC 266), say simply:  
Let us consider, within the diverse spheres in which language moves, the special sphere that 
corresponds to what is for us a language. 
These spheres have to be observed in the individual act. The individual act in the case of 
language supposes two individuals. We shall then have in complete form what can be called 
the speech circuit.3 
                                                          
2 For interesting perspectives on the full range of illustrations in the CLG, see Kim (2008), Christensen (2016). 
3 Original: “Considérons dans les sphères diverses où se meut le langage la sphère spéciale qui correspond à ce 
qui est pour nous la langue. / Ces sphères ont à être observées dans l’acte individuel. L’acte individuel quand il 
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But the CLG (p. 28) adds much more:  
The starting point of the circuit is in the brain of one of them, for example A, where the facts 
of consciousness, which we shall call concepts, get associated with the representations of 
linguistic signs or acoustic images serving to express them. […T]he brain transmits to the 
organs of phonation an impulse correlative to the image; then the sound waves are 
propagated from A’s mouth to B’s ear […]. Then the circuit is prolonged in B in an inverse 
order: from the ear to the brain. 
The brains of the speaker/hearers do not come into what Saussure told his students, either in words 
or in the picture he drew, which his students copied thus (CLG/E 198): 
 
– and which Saussure immediately followed up with this diagram: 
 
The accompanying text makes clear that Saussure’s point is to distinguish between what is 
physiological (phonation and audition) and what is “psychic” (concept and image); and also what is 
external (sound waves), all the rest being internal. In the CLG (p. 28) this diagram gets turned 90 
degrees, the associative centres are removed and, most significantly, the two split circles labelled 
“verbal concept / verbal image” are condensed and modified. 
 
Both the student notes and the published CLG point out that the diagram is incomplete, since, for 
example, a “muscular image” needs to be included for phonation, as an intermediary between the 
acoustic image and the nerve signals sent to the speech apparatus for producing sounds. Each of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
s’agit de langage suppose deux individus. On aura ainsi au complet ce qu’on peut appeler le circuit de la 
parole” (my translation, as are those that follow). I have given a more literal rendering of the CLG passages 
than is found in the published translations by Baskin and Harris.  
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changes introduced in the published version of the diagram is potentially significant, the more so 
because this is the first appearance of Saussure’s conception of the linguistic sign (not counting its 
appearance in Odier 1905, on which see Joseph 2005). As will be seen in Section 4 below, the fact 
that the concept and acoustic image lie side-by-side, rather than one atop the other, ought to matter 
for Lacanian readers; and the arrows going between them in both directions, suggests that their 
relationship is a dynamic, not a static one. The use of the single-letter abbreviations c and i within 
the circles, accompanied by a key in which the terms concept and image acoustique are in the 
singular, not the plural, strengthens the impression that the contents of the two circles are identical 
in speaker and hearer; the fact that image verbale and concept verbal appear twice in Saussure’s 
diagram makes the viewer less inclined to assume that they must be the same. 
The most consequential change is perhaps the dropping of verbal following concept. The CLG text 
does not specify what is meant by concepts other than to call them les faits de conscience [the facts 
of consciousness], whatever that may mean. For Saussure, this conceptual side of the linguistic sign, 
for which he eventually uses the term signifié [signified] (p. 99), is not only specifically verbal but 
bound to a particular signifier in a particular language. A concept as a fact of consciousness that you 
or I may have and for which there is no word is not a signified, not a verbal concept; signifier and 
signified only come into being together. This is the point of the rejection in the CLG (p. 97) of a 
language as a “nomenclature”, the idea that the meanings of words exist before names are attached 
to them. That is such a powerful way of understanding how language works that probably still today 
even most linguists take it for granted that, contra Saussure, meanings precede the creation of signs 
to designate them. 
Roy Harris located the “classic application” of what he called the “sender-receiver model of 
communication” in the CLG (pp. 27-29), contrasting its “segregationism” with Harris’s own 
integrationism. In Joseph (1997: 24-28) I laid out in detail how, in reading the passage on the speech 
circuit, Harris inserts assertions about what each statement from the passage “implies” that are 
plausible (taken out of context) but by no means necessary. Without citing my paper, Harris (1998) 
made it explicit that his reading of this passage is indeed a complete tissue of implications: 
Saussure’s model is segregationist through and through. To see this, we have to realize that 
the model has certain implications that are not immediately apparent in Saussure’s initial 
presentation of it. The most important are as follows. 
1. The model implies that communication is “telementational”, i.e. that communication is a 
process of thought-transference from one person’s mind to another’s. 
2. The model implies that communication is successful only if the concept that originally 
triggered the start of the process in A’s brain is the same as the concept that is eventually 
triggered in B’s brain. [...] 
3. This matching requirement in turn implies that for successful communication a fixed code 
must be in operation. [...] (Harris 1998: 21) 
Out of context, Harris’s interpretation of the CLG passage is not an impossible one; but by no means 
is it the only possible one. The CLG passage is explicitly enquiring into the place of langue within the 
more general sphere of langage, and says nothing about communication, what successful 
communication consists of, or about the concept in A’s brain being the same as the one in B’s. The 
terms “telementational” and “fixed code” do not appear here or elsewhere in Saussure; they are 
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Harris’s. The word “transmission” is used in the CLG (p. 28), but only with reference to the process 
that takes place within each individual, for instance as the acoustic image is translated from the 
speaker’s brain to his speech organs. Between speaker and hearer, all that occurs is “the purely 
physical process” (p. 28, emphasis in the original) of sound waves being propagated from A’s mouth 
to B’s ears. The emphasis on the words “purely physical” — i.e., not mental — confutes Harris’s 
“telementational” interpretation. All that the passage implies about communication is that, when I 
am the one talking, I start with a concept, which triggers a sound pattern that is likewise 
psychological and that then gets realised as spoken sounds via muscular movements; and that when 
I am the one listening, I hear sounds via physical movements transmitted into nerve signals, which 
are then processed as sound patterns and associated with concepts. The point is to lay out the order 
in which these things occur, as a preliminary to locating where exactly the langue fits into the 
picture. This is even before we get to the fact that Saussure’s own drawing has dotted lines 
connecting each head’s mouth to the other’s ear, with the brain literally not in the picture at all. 
Relevant materials from the Saussure manuscripts in the Harvard Houghton Library published by 
Linda (2000) make it all the more apparent that the speech circuit is about, not communication, but 
what goes on within an individual.  
Harris’s belief that Saussure had a “theory of communication” may have derived from the decision 
by the editors of the CLG to extend the lines in the talking heads figure to join the heads’ ears and 
mouth to their brain. Bally and Sechehaye likely assumed that the text made it sufficiently clear that 
what happens within and between the heads is so totally different in character, there was no need 
to mark a distinction between Saussure’s original lines and their extensions. If so, they 
underestimated the power of the visual image. 
 
3 The collective model of langue (but not parole) 
Introduction, Chapter 4 of the CLG (p. 38) illustrates the “collective model” of langue thus: 
1 + 1 + 1 + 1 . . . . . = I 
The point Saussure was trying to make appears to be that the langue of individuals “adds up” to a 
collective singularity. The Roman I to the right of the equal sign is a deviation from the students’ 
notes (CLG/E 38), which have an Arabic 1 there, although in one set of notes (Georges Dégallier’s, 
D208) this 1 is bigger than those to the left of the equal sign. In Constantin’s notes (IIIC 308b), as in 
Marguerite Sechehaye’s (S2.17), all the 1s look alike.  
The Roman numeral I suggests that the collective langue is both the same as, and yet different from, 
the langue in the brain of each individual member of the community. The I can be understood either 
as the langue of an individual blown up to giant size, in line with Archer’s (1988) “upward conflation” 
model of society, or the 1 can be understood as the collective I in microcosm, in line with Archer’s 
“downward conflation” model. Readers interpret the illustration in the CLG according to how they 
already imagine society to be constituted. For many readers, however, it must seem a strange, 
metaphysical mathematics in which an endless series of 1s add up to a one written differently (or 
indeed to 1, as per what Saussure drew on the blackboard). It may also seem to be in counterpoint 
with what the CLG says concerning the letter t (Section 8 below), that however it is written does not 
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alter its value, so long as it is distinct from other letters. With the t example the point being made is 
about the nature of signifiers (as well as signifieds), whereas with the I the point is about the nature 
of langue as opposed to parole, but the potential for perceived inconsistency is there. 
The CLG (p. 38) next contrasts this collective model of langue with the different status of parole, 
which looks like this: 
(1 + 1ʹ + 1ʺ + 1‴ . . . . .) 
In this case the editors have altered what is in the students’ notes (CLG/E 361), which is: 
1 + 1 + 1 + . . . . = 1 + 1 + 1 + . . . . 
Whereas the langue of individuals “adds up” to a collective singularity, their parole remains 
individual and multiple. The CLG version appears to express the same idea, using the primes to show 
that the parole of individuals varies in a way that their langue does not. The editors reinforce this 
message in the text, where they add the word “identical” to the langue in the brain of each speaker, 
a word that does not appear in the students’ notes. Saussure did use the metaphor of a dictionary 
deposited in each speaker’s brain, which would seem to imply identity – but metaphors are by 
definition only ever partially true, and not to be taken literally. The diagram however provides a 
loud, thumping contrapuntal bass that makes it hard to hear the suggestions from the oboe that, 
actually, it is literally impossible that the langue possessed by every speaker in the community is 
identical. Yet this is the theoretical construct on which linguistic analysis has always proceeded, and 
that Saussure and the CLG are trying to clarify, rather than a novel conception being asserted 
axiomatically. 
What are readers to make of the parole diagram being put in brackets (parentheses) while the 
langue diagram is not? Perhaps that there is no reality to parole apart from its individual 
manifestations – a reading that might be strengthened by the lack of an equation. But this is in 
counterpoint with the CLG text, which says that “speech […] is the sum of what people say”, and 
again, just before the diagram, that “there is nothing collective about speech; its manifestations are 
individual and momentary. Here there is nothing more than the sum of the particular cases […]” (p. 
38, my italics) – followed by the diagram showing additions, but no sum. 
 
4 Representing value in the linguistic sign  
Valeur [value] is central to how languages are conceived in the CLG. A langue is a collection of signs, 
each the conjunction of a mental concept, the signified, with a mental sound pattern or sound-
image, the signifier. The term “sound-image” is deceptive, though, because a signifier is not really an 
image, but a value. The values that signifiers and signifieds consist of are nothing other than their 
difference from all the other signifiers and signifieds in the language system. How do you depict 
that? The answer is that pure value cannot be pictured directly; describing it verbally is hard enough, 
and since it has no visual dimension, any illustration of it will of necessity be metaphorical. 
Part One, Chapter 1 of the CLG (p. 97) starts off with an exposition of the “nomenclaturist” view of 
language that Saussure rejects, and which it illustrates thus: 
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The nomenclaturist mistake is to think that the idea or category of tree or horse existed before it 
entered language through the creation of a linguistic sign. The world of phenomena is not presented 
to us pre-categorised; young children do not readily distinguish between large dogs and small 
horses, and even most adults are not sure where the line is drawn between horses and ponies, or 
what the scientific status is of categorical divisions among equids, the broader category of which 
horses are a part. So too with trees, bushes, shrubs and the like.  
The CLG gives a Latin word for tree and horse, as Saussure did in his drawing as copied in the 
students’ notes (CLG/E 1085), though the forms he gave were the pre-classical Latin arbos and the 
nominative singular equus, which, for some reason, the editors changed to equos, either an Old Latin 
nominative singular (in which case, why did they shift arbos to the classical form arbor?) or a 
Classical Latin accusative plural.4 Bally was a Latinist, so the change was not due to ignorance. The 
choice of Latin is itself not explained or remarked upon, either in the students’ notes or in the CLG, 
and it is mysterious to readers, especially those who know no Latin and may not even recognise that 
these are Latin words. But readers who know what the words mean will still wonder why Latin was 
chosen; is there an implication that Latin is special in some way? They have already seen something 
of the sort suggested by the use of the Roman I in the illustration of the collective model of langue, 
as discussed in Section 3 above. Here, perhaps, Latin is meant to symbolise the universality of the 
principle being discussed. 
The next illustration (p. 99) is of what Saussure considers to be the correct model for the linguistic 
sign – a reconfigured version of the one we have already encountered in Section 2 above: 
 
This in turn is followed in the CLG (p. 99) by a pair of specific examples, placed side-by-side: 
 
 
                                                          
4 Marguerite Sechehaye’s notes (S2.8) have just the drawing of the tree and the French word arbre, with no 
horse. 
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The acoustic image is the same in both, arbor, while the concept is pictured in two different ways, by 
the French word arbre in quotation marks, and by the picture of the tree repeated from the 
illustration of nomenclaturism on the previous page. The reader has to make an interpretative 
choice: are «arbre» and the picture the same signified represented two different ways? Or two 
different kinds of signified, a verbal one and a visual one? If different, how do they relate to one 
another? If the same, why give the two representations? Here is what the text says (p. 99), as it 
finally notes that Latin is the language being used: 
Whether we seek the meaning of the Latin word arbor or the word by which Latin designates 
the concept “tree”, it is clear that only the rapprochements appear to conform to reality, and 
we shall put aside any other that might be imagined. 
We are here offered two options for what we “seek”, after being shown two different 
representations. One might well expect readers to understand the text to be saying that “the word 
by which Latin designates the concept ‘tree’” refers to the diagram on the left, which contains 
«arbre», leaving “the meaning of the Latin word arbor” to refer to the diagram on the right – the 
implication being that the meaning of arbor is the picture of the tree. I do not think this was the 
editors’ intention, but it seems like a reasonable interpretation. Some of the further complexities of 
this pair of diagrams are explored in Jakobson (1959). 
The students’ notes do not have this trio of diagrams, just a single one (CLG/E 1094):5 
 
Crucially, Saussure did not draw the linguistic sign containing the picture of the tree: he used the 
tree and horse pictures only to illustrate the nomenclaturism that he rejected. In creating the right-
hand illustration of the sign with the picture representing the signified, the editors opened up a 
Pandora’s box of contrapuntal readings, including ones linking the Saussurean sign to Wittgenstein’s 
“picture theory of meaning” in his early Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1922).  
More than that: many readers have come away from the CLG with the understanding that the 
signified in this sign is not a pure value, not a concept, not even a picture of a tree, but actual trees. 
The CLG text (p. 98) is clear that “The linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and 
an acoustic image”. But the nomenclaturist view is strongly rooted, and one does not have to look 
far to find readings of the CLG that, often using the diagram of the sign containing the tree as an 
illustration, take signifieds to be what Frege (1892) called referents. 
Probably the most influential reading of the sign diagrams has been that of Lacan, whose debt to 
Saussure, like his even greater debt to Freud, is complex and still much debated. On the one hand, 
                                                          
5 Dégallier put this figure later in his notes (CLG/E 1107, D186). A few passages earlier (CLG/E 1096), D185 and 
IIIC 278 give a similar figure labelled concept and image acoustique, without any specific example such as 
arbre, but with a line pointing from concept to the word spirituel [mental], and another from image acoustique 
to matérielle (au sens de sensorielle) [material (in the sense of sensory)].  
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Lacan’s widely circulated view that the unconscious is structured like a language is grounded in his 
reading of the CLG, partly mediated by how his close friends Lévi-Strauss and Merleau-Ponty read it. 
The three of them were jointly responsible for raising the CLG to the status of master-text of mid-
century structuralism. From early on, however, Lacan set about critiquing, subverting and recasting 
Saussure’s main tenets, starting with his model of the linguistic sign, which Lacan insisted must be 
situated in a subject, a human being using it for purposes of symbolising – symbols being the core 
matter of Lacan’s psychoanalytic project. Rather than treating the sign as something static, as in the 
left-hand figure below, Lacan reconfigured it as the “algorithm” for the production of symbolic 
meaning shown on the right:  
S           S 
―         f ― 
s  s 
– where S is the signifier, s the signified, and f the algorithmic function, and with psychoanalytic 
importance attributed to the bar separating S from s. Lacan maintains that the right-hand figure, the 
algorithm, is the basis on which modern linguistics is actually founded, and he says that “The 
thematics of this science is henceforth suspended, in effect, at the primordial position of the signifier 
and the signified as being distinct orders separated initially by a barrier resisting signification” (2005 
[1966]: 114). He refers to signifier and signified as “termes supérieur et inférieur” [upper and lower 
terms] (1966: 254), and presents this diagram of them: 
 
This was of course inspired by the diagram of the sign containing the picture of a tree introduced by 
the editors of the CLG, and more generally all the sign diagrams suggest a reading of signifier and 
signified as being in a vertical – hence implicitly hierarchical – arrangement, with a line dividing the 
sign  in two and acting as a barrier between its component parts. Lacan has left out the oval 
containing them, on the grounds that this suggests a closedness to the process of generating 
symbolic meaning, that is in fact a totally open process. Significantly, given the importance he places 
on their position relative to one another, he has reversed the position of signifier and signified. As 
Lyotard (2011 [1979]: 253) would later note in critiquing Lacan, 
 
Saussure placed the signified above the signifier, and the line which separates them in the 
schemas, far from representing repression or censorship, has so little consistency that it will 
tend to disappear as the notion of value will supersede that of signification in the later 
lectures, the signified of a term being nothing more than a summary of its value, that is, of its 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic entourage. And that entourage is not hidden, but transparent. 
What is unclear and continues to inspire debate is whether Lacan’s repositioning of signifier and 
signified was meant to show what Saussure really meant, or should have meant, or whether Lacan 
just remembered the CLG illustration incorrectly, or his drawing hand was guided by some 
unconscious impulse.  
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5 The speaking mass, language and time 
Part One, Chapter 2 of the CLG (p. 112) contains an initial diagram of the language and the speaking 
mass, on the left below, which is then completed in a second diagram (p. 113) with the addition of a 
“time axis”. 
    
If these diagrams have never attracted as much attention as the preceding ones (apart from the 
detailed study of them by Robert 2012), it may be down to the fact that the preceding chapter has 
stated in no uncertain terms that arbitrariness is the first principle of the linguistic sign, and what 
these language and speaking mass diagrams show is presented as one of the results of arbitrariness, 
and a limit upon it, rather than an illustration of the principle itself. At the same time, while it is clear 
enough that the oval joined to the rectangle is intended to show how the language system is 
anchored by the social reality of people speaking to one another, the status of the bracket and the 
time axis are not so well explained.  
The left-hand figure appears more or less as here, with minor variations, in all the students’ notes 
(CLG/E 1288), the biggest difference being that in Constantin’s (IIIC 324) the lower rectangle is 
labelled masse sociale [social mass] rather than masse parlante [speaking mass]. Either way, it is 
Saussure’s pre-riposte to Lacan: a language as a system of signs is anchored not in a Subject, but in 
Society. The text accompanying the left-hand figure in the CLG (p. 112) says: “a speaking mass is 
necessary for there to be a language”. The curly bracket signifies the inseparability. The point about 
the social nature being an “internal characteristic” of language is directed against a distinction 
linguists regularly made, and continue to make, about internal versus external facts and forces, 
where external means aspects of existence that impact only indirectly on the internal workings of 
the linguistic system. Saussure had been even more adamant on this point in the second course 
(CLG/E 1286): “The system of signs merits consideration only as a social thing. Characteristics 
anterior to this coming into collectivity are unimportant. A system of signs is made properly only for 
the collectivity, and not for an individual”.6 
The CLG (p. 113) then says that the left-hand schema still does not capture the reality of language, 
because it abstracts away “the march of time”. So the Time arrow is added to the right-hand 
schema, but in a confusing form. Why is it attached, by a dotted line, to the link between language 
                                                          
6 Notes of François Bouchardy, B15; original: “Le système de signes ne mérite pas que l’on s’y arrête qu’en tant 
que chose sociale. Les caractères antérieurs à cette venue dans la collectivité sont inimportants. Un système 
de signes n’est proprement fait que pour la collectivité, et non pour un individu”. 
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and the speaking mass?7 Is this meant to suggest that the Time arrow is itself the link between 
them? Why is the arrow placed in such a way that Time appears to be moving from the language to 
the social mass? Or is the dotted line meant to prevent readers from interpreting the arrow in that 
way, and to show instead that the whole conglomerate of language plus speaking mass is moving 
through time – in which case, why not attach the time arrow to the curly bracket? 
How to deal with time was a problem that haunted Saussure from early in his career, and at times 
seems to have obsessed him (see Harris 1987: 199-200; Joseph 2012: 53). In the popular imagination 
Saussure’s linguistics is about taking language out of the passage of time, by focussing on the 
synchronic system rather than historical change, or on how the system gets used in parole. One does 
not need to read very deeply into Saussure’s work in order to discover that his professional interests 
were entirely centred on the “diachronic”, his reformed version of historical enquiry based on the 
comparison of synchronic systems from different points in time. Nor is his semiotics meant to escape 
time: the second principle of the sign, after arbitrariness, is linearity, which is a way of imagining the 
unfolding of signs in time as an “internal” aspect of their nature. This is different from – and yet 
impossible to separate from – the unfolding in time that takes place in parole, when individuals use 
the signs in utterances. There are two different conceptions or dimensions of time involved in 
langue and in parole. Saussure had been aware since at least the early 1890s of contemporary 
philosophical and scientific developments in the understanding of time, through reading 
manuscripts by his brother René that dealt with the subject (see Joseph 2012: 366-368, 390). But 
these new concepts, such as Bergson’s distinction of temps [time] and durée [duration], did not map 
neatly onto the different dimensions of time as Saussure perceived them inhering in langue and 
parole.8 
Before the addition of the Time arrow, the left-hand figure appears to be illustrating the fact that a 
language is not “a free system, organisable as one wishes” (p. 112), as the principle of arbitrariness 
might lead one to believe, because it is anchored by “the social force” (p. 113). The shapes recall a 
balloon that would fly free if it were not tied to the weight below it, which the ambiguous word 
masse [mass] serves to underscore. Saussure though is insistent that this would be a mere 
idealisation unless Time is added – producing the right-hand figure that defies visual interpretation. 
Is Time somehow adding to the pull that the masse parlante exerts on langue? Presumably not; 
nothing in the text suggests this. More likely, it occurred to Saussure that he has been leaving Time 
aside in all his illustrations. If he had been writing the CLG, he might well have gone back and added 
the Time arrow to each of the figures. 
 
                                                          
7 The figure with the downward-pointing arrow appears in all the students’ notes for CLG/E 1298, but with no 
labels, just the oval and rectangle joined by a line, which another line joins to the arrow. In Saussure’s own 
notes for the lecture (N23.6 [3339]), p. 9, the same figure appears, and written to the right of it is masse 
parlante et temps [speaking mass and time]. See further Robert (2012). 
8 The words temps and durée occur in the CLG text shortly before the diagrams, but were an interpolation by 
the editors, who seem to be using them as synonyms rather than following Bergson’s distinction. Bergson’s 
work in this area went back to his doctoral thesis (1889), but it was with the success of Bergson (1907) that he 
became internationally known and his earlier works were widely translated. Also of interest in this context is 
how the linguist Gustave Guillaume, working in an avowedly Saussurean tradition, grappled with the 
difficulties posed by time in language (see Hewson 2008). 
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6 The plant stem 
Part One, Chapter 3 (p. 125) shows a plant stem cut transversally, in order to “show simultaneously 
the autonomy and the interdependence of the synchronic and the diachronic” (p. 124): 
 
This is strikingly different from what is in the student’s notes (CLG/E 1458), which is a very simple 
drawing of two slices, with none of the botanical accuracy of the CLG figure.  
 
What Saussure drew would seem to illustrate clearly how “the point of view creates the object” 
(CLG, p. 23). The horizontal slice, corresponding to synchrony, and the vertical slice, corresponding 
to diachrony, provide two different ways of studying the same plant stem.  
So why did the editors replace this with the much less straightfoward image shown above? Godel 
(1957: 114) comments that “The figure representing synchrony and diachrony by the horizontal and 
vertical sections of a plant (D255-256) is accompanied by a commentary that the students took 
down incompletely, so that Saussure’s reasoning cannot be reconstructed with certainty”.9 It is true 
that Saussure belabours the metaphor beyond what it can usefully sustain, and speaks confusingly of 
the diachronic reality as a “body” (pp. 124-125). 
But might the editors have been trying to mask a further problem? Slicing the plant stem vertically 
does not really provide the equivalent of a diachronic study of a language: that would instead be a 
series of horizontal slices made at different heights of the stem. What the vertical slice corresponds 
to is what historical linguists imagined they were studying, but that Saussure realised is not in fact 
available to study directly, in the way that a plant stem is.  
More generally, the plant stem is a risky metaphor for a language as conceived by Saussure. It is a 
much better metaphor for the conception he set himself against: that of a language as a “living 
thing”, as maintained by the linguistic “naturalists” (on whom see Desmet 1996; Joseph 2012: 377, 
411). For them, a language at any given moment embodies the entire history of which it is a 
projection, just as a plant embodies the history of its growth. For Saussure, however, that is to 
misunderstand the nature of a language as a signifying system, a system of values generated by 
difference – nothing in the plant is comparable to that (see further Saussure 2006 [2002]: 146). 
                                                          
9 Original: “La figure qui représente la synchronie et la diachronie par les deux sections, horizontale et 
verticale, d’un végétal (D255-256) est accompagnée d’un commentaire que les étudiants ont noté 
incomplètement, de sorte que le raisonnement de Saussure ne se laisse pas rétablir avec certitude”. 
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But if the editors’ intention was, as I am implying, to avoid any such contradiction, their inclusion of 
that very realistic plant stem drawing may have had the opposite effect, giving readers the visual 
message that a language really is like a plant, so that the metaphors often applied to languages – 
“living”, “dead”, “dying” and so on – come to be understood literally. 
 
7 The floating realms 
Another frequently cited illustration in the CLG is from Part Two, Chapter 4 (p. 156), showing how a 
language divides up the “floating realms” of (A) “confused ideas” or “thought”, and (B) sounds: 
 
The dotted vertical lines represent how the langue is “a series of contiguous subdivisions”, the role 
of which is “to serve as intermediary between thought and sound, in conditions such that their union 
necessarily results in reciprocal delimitation of units” (pp. 155-156).  
At first sight it is not clear what exactly this is meant to be a picture of – what is being depicted as 
the metaphorical equivalent of sound and thought. The CLG (p. 156) goes on to say: 
Let us imagine air in contact with a body of water: if the atmospheric pressure changes, the 
surface of the water breaks up into a series of divisions, that is to say waves, and these 
undulations will give an idea of the union, and so to speak the coupling, of thought with 
phonic matter. 
It seems that this refers directly to the illustration. But, if so, is A meant to be air, and B water? What 
then is the white space between them? What corresponds to the changing atmospheric pressure – 
the dotted lines, or the shape of A as the reader’s eye moves from left to right? But the waves at the 
top of B correspond only partly to those at the bottom of A. Are both A and B water, being shaped 
simultaneously by a current of air represented by the white space between them? 
Looking to the source materials for clarification, we do not find ready answers. The illustration does 
not appear in the students’ notes in this form, but rather this, labelled “linguistic fact” (CLG/E 1827): 
 
One student’s version (S2.42) has, beneath the bottom dotted line, masse informe [formless mass].10 
This seems like a clearer representation of the metaphor, in that the two dotted lines (apparently 
                                                          
10 S2.42 is also unique in the shape of the top dotted line, which is unexplained: 
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the floating realms of sound and thought), viewed from left to right, are moving in tandem with one 
another and with what is between them, which I take to be the linguistic fact; from the drawings 
alone one could take the dotted lines too to be part of the linguistic fact, though it is then unclear 
why they are dotted. The vertical lines which presumably indicate the start and end of a sign are not 
shown as extending outward into the floating realms, as they are in the CLG version. What happens 
in the centre stays in the centre, though the length of the verticals parallels what is happening in the 
twin floating realms. 
The CLG (p. 156) adds this comment, which reflects closely what is in students’ notes from the 
second course (CLG/E 1829-30): 
Thought, chaotic by nature, is forced to become precise in breaking up. Hence there is neither 
materialisation of thoughts, nor spiritualisation of sounds, but it is a question of this 
somewhat mysterious fact that the “thought-sound” implies divisions and that the language 
works out its units by being constituted between two amorphous masses. 
The word “divisions” links the “units of language” to the dotted vertical lines in the figure from the 
CLG – again leaving unclear what the white area between A and B is meant to represent – and this 
underscores the point that thought is “chaotic” before the creation of linguistic signs. That signs 
bring articulation to both sound and thought is a view most closely associated with Condillac, 
especially in the French-language tradition. No reference is made to Condillac in the CLG or its 
source materials, yet it is as though he is being channelled in this illustration, particularly in the 
editors’ version of it, which also brings to mind the image of the “stream of consciousness”, a term 
created by Bain (1872), the principal figure in the 19th-century associationism that has left 
significant traces in the CLG (see Joseph 2004; 2012: 304-412; 2016 and in press).11 
 
8 Ways of writing t 
Introduction, Chapter 6 of the CLG is about writing, “its utilty, its defects and its dangers” (p. 44), 
with an emphasis on the latter two. The CLG (p. 45) is emphatic that writing represents language, 
rather than actually being language. Yet Part Two, Chapter 4 (p. 165), on linguistic value, gives as an 
illustration of how value is “purely negative and differential” a picture of three different ways in 
which “one single person can write t”: 
 
“The only essential thing”, the text says, “is that his pen distinguish this sign from that of l, d, etc.”. 
One does not have to accept that Derrida was right about Saussure (e.g. in Derrida 1997 [1967]: 52-
57) to be struck by how odd it is that, to illustrate the most fundamental notion in his conception of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
11 “Stream of consciousness” is generally associated with James (1890), to which the creation of the term is 
often miscredited. 
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the language system, Saussure should have recourse to writing, when he is so adamant elsewhere 
that it is misleading to draw inferences from writing to language proper. The editors of the CLG must 
have realised this, since they add statements to make clear that the point about the t’s is not about 
language directly, but about “that other system of signs, writing”. In the students’ notes from the 
second course (CLG/E 1930) Saussure is instead stressing that with writing nous sommes dans le 
même ordre de choses [we are in the same order of things] as with language. For readers of the CLG, 
the illustration is helpful in making them aware of the variation that occurs not just between one 
person and another, but in the reader’s own practice, since everyone has the frequent experience of 
writing the letter t differently at the start or end or in the middle of a word, in cursive versus stand-
alone, in majuscule and minuscule, but with it still being t so long as it has a vertical stroke that is 
crossed. On the page, this is easier to demonstrate than the variation that occurs with spoken 
sounds. But the price of using the letters as examples is that the illustration is haunted by that 
primacy of writing against which we were warned in an earlier section of the text. If writing is indeed 
as primary and dominant in our thinking as Saussure insists, then the earlier message will have run 
against the grain for many readers – whereas the illustration of the letters accords with their 
expectations, providing the comforting assurance that, if you really want to understand the essential 
nature of language, writing is the place to look after all. 
 
9 Conclusion 
For us today, the text of the CLG is not just the book published in 1916. It is inseparable from its later 
editions, source materials, translations and commentaries; from Saussure’s other writings both 
published and unpublished; from the uses to which it has been put by later structuralists and post-
structuralists; and from the vast body of Saussure interpretation, including things that have been 
taught or stated publicly but not published (see Note 1 for an example). All these constitute the 
archive of the text that is itself inscribed into the text.  
As for the figures, they are as central to the text as the words are, not a secondary adjunct to them. I 
have tried to approach variant readings of the figures in the spirit of understanding what generated 
them, and what light the different readings can thrown back onto the text. In the several cases 
where the editors of the CLG made significant changes to the drawings as recorded by Saussure’s 
students – the picture of a tree used to represent the signified being probably the most 
consequential such change – the point has not been to show how they got things wrong, but again 
to infer possible motives for the changes, and to appreciate the richness of the readings they opened 
up. 
To speak of richness in this context is not anti-Saussurean in a theoretical sense, since Saussure’s 
conception of language is not underlain by a naïve commitment to some fixed-code theory or 
telementation, as read into it in Harris’s maximally ungenerous, monopolistic interpretation. On the 
contrary, the perfectionism that emerges from Meillet’s (1913: 119-120) obituary of Saussure as 
having paralysed him from publishing so many of his manuscripts, including all those dealing with 
general considerations on language, stemmed from his realisation that he could not control how 
others would read his lucid and elegant sentences, so as to ensure that his intended meaning came 
through. He had ample evidence of this from his early work, the most blatant example being 
Regnaud (1891). From the biographical evidence, variety of interpretation was not a richness to him, 
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but a problem that felt increasingly insuperable. If he did not explicitly build this into his model of 
the linguistic sign, the language system or the speech circuit – leaving them open to the fixed-code, 
telementational interpretation – he at least did not commit Harris’s out-and-out self-contradiction of 
proclaiming a theory in which no fixed meaning is possible while at the same time insisting that his 
reading of the CLG is the only one possible. 
As mentioned in Section 7, the editors’ picture of the floating realms creates apparent links with 
earlier philosophical and psychological approaches to language and mind. It also links to later ones, 
including the “strong” version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Some readers interpret the CLG as 
maintaining that language determines thought: that the “amorphous mass” is given a rigid shape by 
the way in which particular languages cut up the world of thought into signifieds, leaving no room 
for thought without signifieds. Saussure never says anything of the sort; nor for that matter did Sapir 
or Whorf. It would be hard to imagine Saussure, of all people, entertaining such an idea, given how 
he struggled over decades to find words in which to express his vision of the language system. He 
was loath to introduce neologisms, and had recourse to them only when everyday words simply 
eluded all his attempts to make them express what he wanted. “Signifier” and “signified” appeared 
only in his very last lectures on general linguistics, after years of exasperation with the 
misunderstandings caused by sign, signal, image, concept and other terms. 
If he sometimes resorted to drawings in the hope that they would eliminate the ambiguities, he may 
have learned that instead they opened up whole new realms of ambiguity, while strengthening the 
ones already present in the verbal text. Had he managed to write a book comparable to the CLG, one 
wonders whether he finally would have included any illustrations in it at all. It might have been a 
much longer book, with more spelling out of things to avoid ambiguity than his lectures allowed for, 
making it formidable to read – a book for adepts, but not one able to draw readers in, partly by the 
freedom it allows them to understand its meaning at various levels. One wonders whether such a 
book would have seen its centenary marked in the way the CLG has, for all its faults. 
 
References 
Archer, Margaret S. 1988. Culture and agency: The place of culture in social theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bain, Alexander. 1872. Mind and body: The theories of their relation. New York: D. C. Appleton & Co.  
Bergson, Henri. 1889. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Paris: Félix Alcan. English 
version, Time and free will: Essay on the immediate data of consciousness, trans. F. L. Pogson, 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910. 
Bergson, Henri. 1907. L’Évolution créatrice. Paris: Félix Alcan. English version, Creative evolution, 
trans. Arthur Mitchell, London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. 
Bouquet, Simon. 1997. Introduction à la lecture de Saussure. Paris: Payot. 
Christensen, Hans Dam. 2016. “Plus de figures!”: On Saussure’s use of images. Visual 
Communication, in press. 
17 
 
Derrida, Jacques. 1967. De la grammatologie. Paris: Minuit. English version, Of grammatology, trans. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 2nd ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
Desmet, Piet. 1996. La linguistique naturaliste en France (1867-1922): Nature, origine et évolution du 
langage. Leuven & Paris: Peeters. 
Frege, Gottlob. 1892. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 
100: 25-50. English version, On sense and reference, trans. Max Black, in Peter Geach & Max Black 
(eds.), Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 3rd ed., 1980. 
Harris, Roy. 1987. Reading Saussure: A critical commentary on the Cours de linguistique générale. 
London: Duckworth; LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court. 
Harris, Roy. 1998. Introduction to integrational linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Hewson, John. 2008. Rethinking structuralism: The posthumous publications of Gustave Guillaume 
(1883-1960). Language 84(4).820-844. 
Jakobson, Roman. 1959. Linguistic glosses to Goldstein’s “Wortbegriff”. Journal of Individual 
Psychology 15(1).62-65. 
James, William. 1890. The principles of psychology. 2 vols. New York: Henry Holt. 
Joseph, John E. 1997. The “language myth” myth; or, Roy Harris’s red herrings. In Nigel Love & 
George Wolf (eds.), Linguistics inside out: Roy Harris and his critics, 9-41. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins. 
Joseph, John E. 2004. Les affinités psychologiques de Victor Henry. In Christian Puech (ed.), 
Linguistique et partages disciplinaires à la charnière des XIXe et XXe siècles: Victor Henry (1850-1907), 
291-307. Louvain & Paris: Peeters. 
Joseph, John E. 2005. The centenary of the first publication of Saussure’s sign theory – Odier (1905). 
Historiographia Linguistica 32.309-324. 
Joseph, John E. 2012. Saussure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Joseph, John E. 2016. Language, mind and body: A conceptual history. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Joseph, John E. In press. The cerebral closet: Language as valeur and trésor in Saussure. Swiss Papers 
in English Language and Literature. 
Kim, Sung-Do. 2008. La raison graphique de Saussure. Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure 61.23-42. 
Lacan, Jacques. 1966. Écrits I. Paris: Seuil. English version, Écrits: A selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, 
London: Tavistock; New York: Norton, 1977, repr. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Levin, Jules F. 1989. Saussure and the arbre “tree”: A fundamental misunderstanding. In Irmengard 
Rauch & Gerald F. Carr (eds.), The semiotic bridge: Trends from California, 355-362. Berlin & New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
18 
 
Linda, Markus. 2000. Ferdinand de Saussures Ansatz einer Semiologie des Sprechens und Hörens. In 
Piet Desmet, Lieve Jooken, Peter Schmitter & Pierre Swiggers (eds.), The history of linguistic and 
grammatical praxis: Proceedings of the XIth International Colloquium of the Studienkreis “Geschichte 
der Sprachwissenschaft” (Leuven, 2nd-4th July 1998), 477-490. Leuven: Peeters. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1979. Discours, figure. Paris: Klincksieck. English version, Discourse figure, 
trans. Antony Hudek & Mary Lydon. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.  
Meillet, Antoine. 1913. Nécrologie: Ferdinand de Saussure. École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section 
des sciences historiques et philologiques, Annuaire 1913-1914, 115-123. 
Odier, Henri. 1905. Essai d’analyse psychologique du mécanisme du langage dans la compréhension. 
Berne: Imprimerie Sheitlin Spring & Cie. 
Regnaud, Paul. 1891. Observations critiques sur le système de M. de Saussure. Gray, Haute Sâone: 
Bouffaut Frères. 
Robert, Thomas. 2012. Le facteur temps dans la vie de la langue: Trois interprétations graphiques de 
la pensée saussurienne. Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure 65.125-132. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale. Ed. by Charles Bally & Albert 
Sechehaye, with the assistance of Albert Riedlinger. Lausanne & Paris: Payot. (2nd ed. 1922, 
subsequent eds. essentially unchanged.) Critical ed. by Rudolf Engler, Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours 
de linguistique générale, édition critique, tome 1, 1968; tome 2, fascicule 4, 1974. Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz. English version, Course in general linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1959; another by Roy Harris, London: Duckworth, LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 
1983. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. 2002. Écrits de linguistique générale, ed. by Rudolf Engler & Simon Bouquet, 
with the assistance of Antoinette Weil. Paris: Gallimard. English version, Writings in general 
linguistics, trans. Carol Sanders & Matthew Pires, with the assistance of Peter Figueroa, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Sofia, Estanislao. 2015. La «Collation Sechehaye» du ‘Cours de linguistique générale’ de Ferdinand de 
Saussure: Édition, introduction et notes. Leuven: Peeters. 
Stroheim, Erich von. 1941. Review of Citizen Kane. Decision: A Review of Free Culture 1(6).91-93. 
Online at http://www.fredcamper.com/M/VonStroheim.html 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Trans. by C. K. Ogden. London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench & Trubner. (Orig. publ. in German in Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 1921.) 
